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INTRODUCTION
Assume Bill has met Robin on the Internet. He portrays
himself as a single doctor. After the tenth date Robin and Bill
have sexual relations. Can Bill's wife sue Robin? Absolutely!
... Bill has signed a separation agreement that says he and
his wife can live as if unmarried in all respects. It is signed,
notarized, and drafted by attorneys. It doesn't include a third
* Copyright © 2009 by Caroline L. Batchelor.
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party waiver. Bill tells Robin they have been legally separated.
She is skittish about the fact that he is separated until she reads
the language from his separation agreement that says they can
live as if they were not married. And it is, after all, notarized.
Feeling assured, they proceed to have a romantic relationship.
Can Bill's wife sue Robin? Absolutely!1
Absolutely-if you live in North Carolina. Though a majority of
states have abolished the "heart balm" torts of criminal conversation
and alienation of affections,2 these torts are "alive and well in North
Carolina."3  At common law, criminal conversation enabled a
husband to sue his wife's lover for money damages.4 These damages
were thought to compensate him for the injury to his spousal right of
his wife's fidelity.5 Though this classic case has changed over time,
criminal conversation still exists in North Carolina as a cause of
action to seek recovery for the defendant's sexual intercourse with
the plaintiff's spouse.6 The tort requires two elements: (1) an existing
marriage between the spouses plus (2) sexual intercourse between the
defendant and plaintiff's spouse during coverture.7  In the past
decade, North Carolina plaintiffs have enjoyed damages exceeding
1. Mary Nell Craven, Teutonian Triangles, FAM. F. (N.C. Bar Ass'n Family Law
Section, Raleigh, N.C.), June 2007, at 1, 1, available at http://family.ncbar.org/Newsletters/
Newsletters/DownloadsGetFile.aspx?id=6459.
2. Alienation of affections is the sister "heart balm" tort of criminal conversation. It
allows "[a] plaintiff [to seek] damages for the third party's role in estranging the affections
of his or her spouse," which usually means a loss of consortium. 1 SUZANNE REYNOLDS,
LEE'S NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 5.45, at 386 (5th ed. 1993). The basis of this
cause of action is that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of his " 'conjugal rights to the
society, affection and assistance of his wife.' " Id. (quoting Chestnut v. Sutton, 207 N.C.
256, 257, 176 S.E.2d 743, 743 (1934)).
3. See id. § 5.44, at 386. The states that have abolished criminal conversation include:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. See id. § 5.45, at 387 n.666 (1993 & Supp. 2008). The District of Columbia
has also abolished this tort. See id.
4. LAURA HANFT KOROBKIN, CRIMINAL CONVERSATIONS 20 (1998).
5. Id.
6. 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 5.45, at 386.
7. See Brown v. Hurley, 124 N.C. App. 377, 380, 477 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1996). "'The
fact that the wife consented, that she was the aggressor, that she represented herself as
single, that she was mistreated or neglected by her husband, that she and husband were
separated through no fault of her own, or that her husband was impotent, [are] not valid
defenses.'" DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 442, at 1246 (2000) (quoting Kline v.
Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 930 (Md. Ct. App. 1980)).
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one million dollars when they successfully pursued a criminal
conversation claim.' The continued existence of the "heart balm"
torts in North Carolina is a subject of controversy among family law
practitioners, the state legislature, and the state supreme court.9 This
Comment will focus on the tort of criminal conversation. Alienation
of affection is the other "heart balm" tort usually discussed in
conjunction with criminal conversation. Though alienation of
affection will be analyzed briefly when comparisons with criminal
conversation are relevant," alienation of affection is not the focus of
this piece."
This Comment will begin with a brief history of the tort of
criminal conversation and its origins at common law. Part II will
discuss the status of the tort in North Carolina today, how it has
developed in the case law, and the debate on whether to abolish it.
Part III will argue for the abolition of criminal conversation in North
Carolina. Criminal conversation should be abolished in North
Carolina because its origins are outdated and irrelevant, it is
susceptible to abuse by blackmail and excessive damages awards, it
does not effectively deter marital infidelity, and it discourages
collaborative divorce.
I. THE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL CONVERSATION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND NORTH CAROLINA
A. Criminal Conversation at Common Law
The roots of criminal conversation are in seventeenth century
English law.12 Historically, criminal conversation was based on two
major legal precepts: adultery 3 was a criminal act, and women had
8. See, e.g., Hutelmyer v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 364, 514 S.E.2d 554 (1999) (affirming a
million dollar jury verdict for the plaintiff); see also infra Part II.C.
9. See, e.g., Craven, supra note 1, at 1; see also infra Part II.
10. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
11. The elements of alienation of affection are discussed supra note 2.
12. William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery and Save
Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 985, 1003 (2001).
13. "Adultery" for purposes of this Comment is defined as habitual sexual intercourse
between two people who are not married. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2007)
(classifying adultery as a Class 2 Misdemeanor); see, e.g., Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham
Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 303 n.1, 266 S.E.2d 818, 823 n.1 (1980) (noting that the
only sexual relationship that North Carolina law protects is that between married
partners); State v. Kleiman, 241 N.C. 277, 279-80, 85 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1954) (noting that a
single act of illicit sexual intercourse is not fornication and adultery as defined by § 14-184,
but that habitual sexual intercourse for two weeks was sufficient to constitute the offense).
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no legal status.14 At common law, adultery was illegal. 5 Adultery
was severely punished in ancient civilizations, and the punishments
were worse for women than men. 6 Historians noted the disparities in
punishment between men and women. 7  For example, "[t]he
infidelity of the husband is far from having similar consequences. The
woman could not complain of it."' 8 Some civilizations permitted the
man to kill his wife's seducer with no legal repercussions and allowed
the adulteress to be mutilated by dogs.' 9 Some punishments were
intended to publicly humiliate the adulteress, such as "running of the
gauntlet" nude.2" The extreme and public punishments for adultery
were evidence of how seriously society valued marital fidelity but
were also illustrative of the inequalities between the sexes within the
institution of marriage.
The barbaric treatment of adulteresses in ancient civilizations
was somewhat diminished in English law. At English common law,
criminal conversation focused more on the plaintiff's property right in
his wife rather than the humiliation of the adulteress." Blackstone
14. See, e.g., JEAN BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW 17 (Rapelje
Howell trans., Little, Brown, & Co. 1912) (noting the control husbands held over
adulterous wives and the severe punishments some women had to face).
15. Corbett, supra note 12, at 1002. The illegality of adultery still exists today. In
North Carolina, adultery is a misdemeanor. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
16. See Corbett, supra note 12, at 1002.
17. See, e.g., BRISSAUD, supra note 14, at 17 (commenting on the consequences that
women had to suffer for their infidelity).
18. Id.
19. Corbett, supra note 12, at 1002.
20. Id. at n.65. Running the gauntlet was a gruesome affair. "According to the
Germanic custom, the guilty wife, naked and with her hair shaved, was driven out of the
house in the presence of the relatives by her husband, who pursued her through the village
beating her." BRISSAUD, supra note 14, at 17.
21. Corbett, supra note 12, at 1003; see also KOROBKIN, supra note 4, at 27.
Describing early criminal conversation actions, Korobkin cites an English case from 1620
in which the defendant was alleged to have
"assaulted Elizabeth, the plaintiff's wife, and beat and ill-treated her, and took and
carried away the said Elizabeth together with a gown, a petticoat, a smock and a
head-dress valued at 20 pounds, of the plaintiff's goods and chattels, and detained
and kept her for five years without the plaintiffs leave, whereby the plaintiff
wholly lost the comfort and company and also the advice and help in domestic
affairs which the plaintiffs could and should have had and enjoyed with his wife
during that time."
KOROBKIN, supra note 4, at 27 (quoting Hyde v. Cyssell [sic], 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (1619)).
Korobkin notes that "sex is nowhere mentioned," and instead, the emphasis is on the
goods the wife left with and the services she would have rendered. Id. "The text describes
a trespass on property, a theft of clothing, a kidnapping, and a physical assault. In all
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shared this sentiment, noting that criminal conversation creates a
"civil injury."22 The injured spouse is given satisfaction through "an
action of trespass ... wherein the damages recovered are usually very
large and exemplary."23 When a man trespassed on another man's
wife, the adulterer was obliged to pay damages for the injury as if he
had taken the plaintiff's livestock or gone uninvited onto the
plaintiff's land.24 The wife was regarded as a form of property, and
the adulterer was required to replace what he took through the act of
adultery.25 Commentators have also compared criminal conversation
to actions available to masters when servants left or were lured away:
"If the defendant injured a servant or enticed him away from service,
the master would have a cause of action for the loss. Similar rules
applied if the master's wife was injured or enticed away."26 Thus, the
origins of criminal conversation stem from the common law of
trespass in which wives, like servants, were considered the property of
their husbands and masters.2
B. Criminal Conversation in the United States
All states except Louisiana initially recognized the husband's
exclusive right of action to a claim of criminal conversation.28 The
exclusivity of the action to male plaintiffs changed with the passage of
the Married Women's Property Acts.29 The Acts generally required
that state courts choose one of three options. The court could hold
that a husband no longer had a right to his wife's services, find that
the wife had a complementary right to the services of her husband, or
likelihood, however, no one was hurt, no force was used, and Elizabeth was wearing the
gown and petticoat when she left with her lover." Id.
22. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 137 (2d ed. 2002)
(commenting that a criminal conversation claim, in form, "was an action in trespass").
25. See KOROBKIN, supra note 4, at 139 (construing the traditional criminal
conversation claim as one that focused on the defendant's injury to the property interest of
the non-adulterating spouse).
26. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 442, at 1245 (internal footnotes omitted); see also Corbett,
supra note 12, at 1003 (comparing an action in criminal conversation to the enticement of
a servant away from his master).
27. Corbett, supra note 12, at 1003.
28. Id. at 1005. The husband's right was recognized as early as the late nineteenth
century. Id.
29. Id. The Married Women's Property Acts were a series of state laws enacted over
the course of the nineteenth century that changed common law principles affecting the
rights of married women. See Law Library of Congress, Married Women's Property Laws,
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awlaw3/propertylaw.html (last visited Aug. 24,
2009).
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ignore the historical basis of the tort and extend it to women.30 Most
states, including North Carolina, recognized a wife's right to the
action.31
Currently, however, a great number of states have abolished
criminal conversation either by explicit legislation or by judicial
decision.32 Indiana was the first state to abolish the tort, doing it
through a legislative act ironically titled "An Act to promote public
morals."3 3 The belief that criminal conversation leads to blackmail
and promotes vindictive behavior moved many states' legislatures and
courts to abolish the tort.34 However, there are a handful of states,
North Carolina included, in which the tort still exists. 35
C. Criminal Conversation's Development in North Carolina Courts
Criminal conversation in North Carolina has developed through
a handful of judicial precedents. In Johnston v. Allen,36 an 1888 case,
the court found the defendant liable for criminal conversation. The
court based its conclusion primarily on circumstantial evidence that
the defendant gave the plaintiff's wife a sewing machine and had the
machine delivered to the wife while she was on the defendant's land.37
A 1920 case, Cottle v. Johnson,38 contains dicta that reflect the gender
attitudes and social mores that were the basis of common law criminal
conversation.3 9 The court described the injury to the plaintiff as the
"defilement of [his] wife by sexual relation."4 The court, generally
describing criminal conversation actions, stated:
In criminal conversation, "The authorities show the husband
has certain personal and exclusive rights with regard to the
30. Corbett, supra note 12, at 1005-06.
31. Id. at 1006. North Carolina recognized a wife's action against her husband in
criminal conversation in Knighten v. McClain, 227 N.C. 682, 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947).
32. 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 5.45, at 387 n.666 (1993 & Supp. 2008).
33. Corbett, supra note 12, at 1007; see 1935 Ind. Acts 1009 (codified at IND. CODE.
ANN. § 34-12-2-1 (1999)).
34. See 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 5.45, at 388.
35. The following states, in addition to North Carolina, still recognize criminal
conversation: Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, and Utah. Id.
§ 5.45, at 388 n.667 (1993 & Supp. 2008).
36. 100 N.C. 131, 5 S.E. 666 (1888).
37. Id. at 133-34, 5 S.E. at 667; see also supra Part L.A (noting how early cases in
criminal conversation emphasized the loss of property rights rather than the adultery
itself).
38. 179 N.C. 426, 102 S.E. 769 (1920).
39. See id. at 428-29, 102 S.E. at 770.
40. Id. at 428, 102 S.E. at 770.
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person of his wife which are interfered with and invaded by
criminal conversation with her; that such an act on the part of
another man constitutes an assault even when, as is almost
universally the case as proved, the wife in fact consents to the
act, because the wife is in law incapable of giving any consent to
affect the husband's rights as against the wrongdoer; and that
an assault of this nature may properly be described as an injury
to the personal rights and property of the husband, which is
both malicious and willful."41
The dicta, relied upon by the court to reach its holding, reflect
outdated generalities about gender and sexual autonomy no longer
cited by courts today. Still, neither Johnston nor Cottle has been
overruled or overturned by a subsequent decision.
The elements of a criminal conversation action are well
entrenched in a large body of North Carolina case law.42  Brown v.
Hurley43 holds that all the tort requires is an actual existing marriage
plus sexual intercourse between the defendant and the plaintiff's
spouse.44 In addition, Scott v. Kiker45 holds that the plaintiff's own
infidelity does not bar recovery for criminal conversation. 46  The
plaintiff's consent is the only substantive defense to a claim for
criminal conversation. 47  A recent 2006 decision, Misenheimer v.
Burris,48 holds that the three-year statute of limitations period for
criminal conversation begins to run when the tort is discovered or
should have been discovered, not upon completion of the last act
constituting the offense. 49  The mere fact of a valid separation"
41. Id. at 428-29, 102 S.E. at 770 (quoting Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 481 (1904)).
42. See, e.g., Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 198 S.E. 619 (1938) (holding that the
mere fact of a separation will not bar a recovery for criminal conversation); Brown v.
Hurley, 124 N.C. App. 377, 380, 477 S.E.2d 234, 238 (1996) ("The elements of criminal
conversation are the actual marriage between spouses and sexual intercourse between
defendant and plaintiff's spouse during the coverture."); Scott v. Kiker, 59 N.C. App. 458,
297 S.E.2d 142 (1982) (finding that the plaintiff's own infidelity did not bar a recovery for
criminal conversation).
43. 124 N.C. App. 377,477 S.E.2d 234 (1996).
44. Id. at 380, 477 S.E.2d at 238.
45. 59 N.C. App. 458, 297 S.E.2d 142 (1982).
46. Id. at 463, 297 S.E.2d at 146.
47. Cannon v. Miller, 71 N.C. App. 460, 472, 322 S.E.2d 780, 789 (1984). Similarly, the
connivance of a spouse in the adultery of the other spouse will bar an action for criminal
conversation. See Barker v. Dowdy, 223 N.C. 151, 25 S.E.2d 404 (1943) (illustrating the
difficulty of proving a plaintiff's connivance, and holding that the fact that the plaintiff
continued to live with his wife while she had an affair did not constitute a showing that the
plaintiff connived in her adultery).
48. 360 N.C. 620, 637 S.E.2d 173 (2006).
49. Id. at 624-25, 637 S.E.2d at 176.
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between plaintiff and his or her spouse will also not bar an action for
criminal conversation.5 Though the tort is firmly entrenched in
North Carolina case law, there have been unsuccessful efforts in the
state to abolish it.
II. THE CURRENT APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL CONVERSATION IN
NORTH CAROLINA
A. An Unsuccessful Effort by the North Carolina Court of Appeals
to Abolish Criminal Conversation
Though criminal conversation is alive and well in North Carolina,
the court of appeals has expressed its distaste for criminal
conversation. In a 1985 case, Cannon v. Miller,52 the court of appeals
attempted to abolish criminal conversation and alienation of
affections, 53 but the Supreme Court of North Carolina overruled that
decision.54 The facts of Cannon, as stated by the court of appeals, are
similar to many criminal conversation actions. The Cannons were
married in May of 1975, and evidence suggested they had an unhappy
marriage. In 1979, Mrs. Cannon started working at the Pitt County
Courthouse, where she met and proceeded to have a romantic
relationship with Jeffrey Miller.56 The Cannons were divorced in
1981, and Mr. Cannon brought an action against Miller for criminal
conversation, alleging that on numerous occasions prior to May 1981
Mrs. Cannon and Miller had sexual intercourse. 7 Miller denied the
allegations, and the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for
Miller in light of its abolition of criminal conversation. 58
50. "Separation" in North Carolina is when two spouses live "separate and apart" for
one year prior to obtaining a divorce. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (2008) ("Marriages may be
dissolved and the parties thereto divorced from the bonds of matrimony on the application
of-either party, if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for one
year, and the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for divorce has resided in the State for a
period of six months.").
51. Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 198 S.E. 619 (1938). This element of the tort will
be discussed in more detail infra Part II.B.
52. 71 N.C. App. 460, 322 S.E.2d 780 (1984), vacated, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888
(1985).
53. Id. at 497, 322 S.E.2d at 804.
54. Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985).
55. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 460-61, 322 S.E.2d at 783.
56. Id. at 461, 322 S.E.2d at 783.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 497, 322 S.E.2d at 804.
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The court of appeals' opinion in Cannon was a synthesis of the
many arguments that numerous other states have cited to abolish
criminal conversation. The court argued that the common law origins
of criminal conversation 59 -from public beating of adulteresses to
money damages for the husband-illustrated how outdated the tort
was.6" The court also cited the misogynistic and sexist language of
Cottle as reasons for abolition.6" Additionally, the court cited case law
in which the court of appeals changed common law rules relating to
marriage to illustrate that "absent a legislative declaration, the courts
possess the authority to alter judicially created common law rules
when such action is deemed necessary in light of experience and
reason."62 The case law included the "equalization of presumption of
gift in inter-spousal property conveyances," judicial alteration of the
''common law rule rendering spouses incompetent to testify against
each other in a criminal [trial]," and "recognition of [a] cause of
action for [a] spouse's loss of consortium when joined with a personal
injury action."63 The court found:
A review of the historical and theoretical bases of the
actions, and the largely unsuccessful attempts to articulate a
convincing modern basis for the "heart balm" torts lead us to
conclude that there is no continuing legal basis for the retention
of these tort actions today. They protect no interests and
further no public policies not better served by other means, and
the potentialities for abuse posed by their existence outweighs
[sic] any possible benefits to be obtained by their retention in
contemporary society. While the historical remedies allowed
by these causes of action have undergone some progressive
changes through the years, the actions remain permeated with
the uncultivated and obsolete ideas which marked their origin.
We hold that the causes of action of alienation of affections and
criminal conversation are hereby abolished in this jurisdiction.6"
Despite the court of appeals' argument, the supreme court
swiftly overruled the court of appeals decision.65 The supreme court,
with cursory language, noted that the court of appeals, in making its
59. Id. at 471-72, 322 S.E.2d at 789.
60. Id. at 497, 322 S.E.2d at 803-04.
61. Id. at 473, 322 S.E.2d at 790 (citing Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426, 428-29, 102
S.E. 764, 770 (1920)) (describing the "certain personal and exclusive rights" that a husband
has "with regard to the person of his wife").
62. Id. at 496, 322 S.E.2d at 803.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 497, 322 S.E.2d at 803-04.
65. Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985).
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decision, "acted under a misapprehension of its authority to overrule
decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina."66 Accordingly,
the decision of the court of appeals attempting to abolish the tort of
criminal conversation was vacated.67 It is notable that the supreme
court did not include a justification for criminal conversation in its
opinion overruling the court of appeals. The purpose of the opinion,
it seems, was to correct the court of appeals' misunderstanding of its
authority, and not to bolster the tort. Nevertheless, after the supreme
court reinstated the tort, plaintiffs continued to file criminal
conversation actions in the late 1990s and 2000s.68 The Cannon
decisions illustrate the continued controversy that criminal
conversation creates in the North Carolina legal community.
B. The Complications of Post-Separation Conduct
During the late 1990s and 2000s, valid separation agreements did
not prevent criminal conversation claims,69 and high damages awards
for criminal conversation actions brought North Carolina into the
national spotlight. In Johnson v. Pearce,° the court of appeals held
that a claim for criminal conversation may be based solely upon post-
separation sexual relations.71 The court of appeals took this holding a
step further in Nunn v. Allen72 to find that even a valid separation
agreement will not bar a claim for criminal conversation.73
The plaintiff, Donald Nunn, brought an action for criminal
conversation against his former wife's boyfriend.74 Although the facts
were somewhat disputed, it appeared that Mrs. Nunn and the
defendant became acquainted at work before Mrs. Nunn's marriage
ended.75 The defendant contended that no sexual relationship existed
between him and Mrs. Nunn until after the Nunns were living apart
and signed a separation agreement in September of 1997.76 The
agreement provided:
66. Id. at 324, 327 S.E.2d at 888.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Mark Johnson, Making it Safer to Fool Around After You Split, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 17, 2009, at All.
69. See, e.g., Nunn v. Allen, 154 N.C. App. 523,535-36, 574 S.E.2d 35, 43-44 (2002).
70. 148 N.C. App. 199, 557 S.E.2d 189 (2001).
71. Id. at 201, 557 S.E.2d at 190.
72. 154 N.C. App. 523, 574 S.E.2d 35 (2002).
73. Id. at 536, 574 S.E.2d at 44.
74. Id. at 528-29, 574 S.E.2d at 39.
75. Id. at 528, 574 S.E.2d at 39.
76. Id. at 528-29, 574 S.E.2d at 39.
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LIVING SEPARATE: Husband and Wife shall continue to
live separate and apart, each at such place of residence as he or
she may freely choose, free from all interference, authority and
control, direct or indirect, by the other party, as fully as if each
party were unmarried. Neither shall molest the other nor harass
the other, nor compel nor endeavor to compel the other to
cohabit or dwell with him or her.77
The defendant raised two issues to contest the criminal
conversation claim. First, he argued that this case was distinguishable
from Johnson because of the valid separation agreement that
provided the parties should live separately as an unmarried couple.78
Second, the defendant argued that the separation agreement was, in
effect, the equivalent of the plaintiff's consent for Mrs. Nunn to have
sexual relations with another man.79  The court refused to accept
either defense.80
A brief analysis of the defendant's arguments reveals the
detrimental impact of Nunn on defendants in later criminal
conversation cases. The court rejected the defendant's first
argument-that the separation agreement allowing the parties to live
separately as if unmarried barred a criminal conversation claim-by
strictly construing the agreement as a contract between the Nunns
whose terms were to be applied exclusively to the spouses.8" The
court noted that "[s]eparation agreements are generally construed
like any contract between two parties."82 Since the defendant was not
a party to the agreement, its terms did not apply to him. 3 The
provisions in the agreement that addressed the spouse's " 'right to
exclusive sexual intercourse' "' with one another "related only to the
spouses' rights against each other," and "[a]s a matter of law ... did
not waive the parties' rights, with respect to third parties for purposes
of a criminal conversation claim."85 The court held the separation
agreement did not shield the defendant from liability based on his
77. Id. at 535, 574 S.E.2d at 43 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 536, 574 S.E.2d at 43. The defendant argued that his case was
distinguishable from Johnson because, although both cases were based on post-separation
conduct, there was no separation agreement in Johnson. Id.
79. Id. at 536, 574 S.E.2d at 44.
80. Id. at 536-37, 574 S.E.2d at 43-44.
81. Id. at 536, 574 S.E.2d at 43-44.
82. Id. at 536, 574 S.E.2d at 43.
83. Id. at 536, 574 S.E.2d at 43-44.
84. Id. at 535, 574 S.E.2d at 43 (quoting Johnson v. Pearce, 148 N.C. App. 199, 200,
557 S.E.2d 189. 190 (2001)).
85. Id. at 536, 574 S.E.2d at 43-44.
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post-separation sexual relationship with Mrs. Nunn.86 The court's
reasoning leaves unanswered the question of whether parties to a
separation agreement could ever create a contract that protects third
parties from criminal conversation claims. Perhaps a third party
waiver would protect others from liability, but this proposition is not
supported by North Carolina case law.87
The defendant's second argument was that the separation
agreement was the equivalent of the plaintiff's consent for Mrs. Nunn
to have sexual relations with another man.88 The court stated that it
was aware of no authority in North Carolina that supported the
defendant's position.89 The court cited Lee's North Carolina Family
Law,9 in which Professor Reynolds suggests that to establish the
plaintiff's consent, the defendant would be required to show that,
before the sexual intercourse between the defendant and the
plaintiff's spouse occurred, the plaintiff "either encouraged the
conduct or at least approved it."'" The court found no evidence that
the plaintiff approved of the sexual conduct between the defendant
and Mrs. Nunn, and thus concluded that the separation agreement did
not establish the plaintiff's consent "without evidence of plaintiff's
prior knowledge and approval of defendant's sexual intercourse with
Mrs. Nunn while she was married to plaintiff."92
The record contained evidence that the plaintiff knew of the
defendant's partiality to Mrs. Nunn prior to the separation, and had
even seen Mrs. Nunn and the defendant engaged in what appeared to
86. Id.
87. It is possible that parties to a separation agreement could waive their right to sue a
potential third party defendant for criminal conversation. It is a general principle of
contract law that a party to a contract may waive any provisions made for his or her
benefit. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 635 (2004). Whether such a waiver would be
enforceable after Nunn is unknown. A defendant in a criminal conversation action is
unlikely to prevail on a claim that he is a third party beneficiary of the contract between
the spouses in the separation agreement. To prevail on a third party beneficiary claim, the
contract must have been entered into for the defendant's "direct" benefit. See Leasing
Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 405-06, 263 S.E.2d 313, 317 (1980) ("To establish a
claim based on the third party beneficiary contract doctrine, a complaint's allegations must
show: (1) the existence of a contract between two other persons; (2) that the contract was
valid and enforceable; and (3) that the contract was entered into for his direct, and not
incidental, benefit."). Considering the nature of a criminal conversation action, it is
unlikely that the plaintiff spouse would have willingly entered into the separation
agreement intending for the defendant to enjoy a direct benefit of the contract.
88. Nunn, 154 N.C. App. at 536, 574 S.E.2d at 44.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 537, 574 S.E.2d at 44 (referring specifically to § 5.46(B), at 405).
91. Id. at 536-37, 574 S.E.2d at 44.
92. Id. at 537, 574 S.E.2d at 44.
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be oral sex the day prior to the signing of the separation agreement.93
With knowledge of this conduct, the plaintiff then signed an
agreement allowing his wife to live as if unmarried to him, and
subsequently pursued a claim of criminal conversation against the
defendant.94 He knew that his marriage was over and that his wife
was interested in another man. He signed an agreement to live as if
he was not married to her, and subsequently sought liability from the
defendant. The plaintiff exploited his wife's and her lover's ignorance
of the law, and recovered damages from the lover, whom the
separation agreement did not protect. And, North Carolina law
supported the plaintiff the entire time.
Nunn remains good law in North Carolina, and its effect is to
guarantee that any sexual relationship between a person who is
legally separated and a third party is fraught with risk. In Harris v.
Stamey,96 a case decided shortly before Nunn, the defendant did not
engage in sexual intercourse with the plaintiff's wife for the first time
until after plaintiff separated from his wife.97 Still, the post-separation
conduct was sufficient to establish a claim of criminal conversation.98
The effect of these cases is to prohibit people who have not met the
one-year separation requirement from initiating a sexual relationship
with another person.99 For those who choose to begin a relationship
with a person whose divorce is not final, they open themselves up to
93. Id. at 528-29, 574 S.E.2d at 39.
94. See infra Part III.C. Criminal conversation is a trap for the unwary. Although it is
difficult to infer from the facts given, the sequence of events suggests that perhaps Mr.
Nunn was planning all along to use his wife's partiality for the defendant as leverage to get
a substantial damages award.
95. Nunn, 154 N.C. App. at 542, 574 S.E.2d at 47.
96. No. COA01-1475, 2002 N.C App. LEXIS 2368 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2002).
97. Id. at *3.
98. Id. at *4.
99. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (2008). For an argument that the one-year separation
requirement should be shortened, see 2 LLOYD T. KELSO, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY
LAW PRACTICE § 18:6, at 171 (2008).
While a decision to divorce is not a decision that should be made in haste, in
twenty-first century North Carolina, the State should have already adopted a
policy that a marriage is no longer salvageable once parties have separated and
have entered into a valid separation agreement that provides that they intend to
live separate and apart indefinitely....
As Justice Eagles said, "little is to be gained, and much harm may result, from
denial of divorce when the parties have reached the point where they are wholly
discordant and no longer living together."
2 KELSO, supra, § 18:6, at 171 (quoting Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855
(1986)). The argument for a shorter separation period is the subject for another paper.
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liability for criminal conversation whether or not they are aware of
the tort or that their conduct has any legal repercussions.
C. High Damages Awards Popularize Criminal Conversation
Actions
During the late 1990s and the first decade of 2000, the success of
North Carolina plaintiffs in criminal conversation actions received
national attention.l °° When Dorothy Hutelmyer sued her husband's
secretary and second wife for having an affair with Dorothy's
husband, she won a million dollar jury verdict-500,000 in
compensatory damages and another $500,000 for punitive damages. 1
The Lifetime Movie Network made Dorothy's story into a television
movie titled, "The Price of a Broken Heart. °10 2 To entice viewers, the
movie trailer asked: "What would you do if your husband of 18 years
divorced you for his sexy secretary? ... Well, Dorothy Hutelmyer
did the unthinkable: She sued the woman who stole her husband and
destroyed her marriage. What followed was a landmark lawsuit that
had wives everywhere cheering."10 3 Ms. Hutelmyer's successful case
might be one of the most publicized, but it is certainly not the only
successful criminal conversation action enjoyed by a plaintiff in the
last decade in North Carolina."° Other North Carolina plaintiffs
followed Ms. Hutelmeyer's example, receiving damages awards
ranging from the tens of thousands to the millions."l 5
In actions for criminal conversation, plaintiffs often seek punitive
damages in addition to compensatory damages. For this reason,
many North Carolina plaintiffs have received damage awards in the
tens of thousands of dollars if not more.0 6  In addition to the
100. See, e.g., Hutelmyer v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 364, 375, 514 S.E.2d 554, 562 (1999)
(providing a verdict of one million dollars against the defendant female who had an affair
with the plaintiff's husband).
101. Id. at 375, 514 S.E.2d at 562; Corbett, supra note 12, at 994-95.
102. The Price of a Broken Heart (Lifetime Movie Network television broadcast Aug.
25, 1999); see Foon Rhee, Jilted Wife Takes Her Tale to TV Screen, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (N.C.), Aug. 14, 1999, at 1C.
103. Rhee, supra note 102, at 14C (quoting the trailer for "The Price of a Broken
Heart").
104. See infra note 106.
105. See, e.g., infra note 107.
106. See, e.g., Oddo v. Presser, 358 N.C. 128, 592 S.E.2d 195 (2004) (per curiam)
(affirming the trial court's award of $910,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in
punitive damages for plaintiff); Boileau v. Seagrave, No. COA07-1431, 2008 N.C. App.
LEXIS 1833, at *21-22 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2008) (affirming the judgment for plaintiff
and finding defendant liable for criminal conversation, liable for $1.00 in compensatory
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Hutelmyer case, a Greensboro woman received one million dollars in
punitive damages and another million dollars in compensatory
damages against the woman she alleged broke up her marriage."7
Another North Carolina man successfully sued a physician who had
an affair with the man's wife.' The jury directed the defendant to
pay the plaintiff $910,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in
punitive damages." A Burlington paper reported in 2006 that in the
preceding five years at least fourteen alienation of affection and
criminal conversation lawsuits were filed in Alamance County
Superior Court.1 ' The article linked the large number of suits filed to
the success of Dorothy Hutelmyer."1 These cases illustrate what has
become a growing trend among North Carolina plaintiffs.
D. Failed Legislative Efforts to Abolish Criminal Conversation
North Carolina legislators have made numerous attempts to
abolish criminal conversation in the state.1 2  State legislators
frequently propose bills to abolish criminal conversation, but the bills
damages, and liable for $105,000 in punitive damages); Teague v. Teague, No. COA01-
646, 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 1877, at *1-2, *12-13 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2002)
(dismissing the appeal that challenged a jury award of $500,000 in compensatory damages
and $100,000 in punitive damages for plaintiff in criminal conversation suit); Hutelmyer,
133 N.C. App. at 375, 514 S.E.2d at 562 (affirming lower court's award of $500,000 in
compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages for plaintiff in criminal
conversation suit).
107. Mike Fuch, Suit Over Husband's Affair Leads to $2 Million Award, NEWS & REC.
(GREENSBORO, N.C.), Nov. 10, 2001, at Al. The award surpassed a $1.4 million verdict a
jury awarded to Davidson College's head wrestling coach who sued a doctor for having an
affair with his former wife. Id.; see also Oddo, 358 N.C. at 128,592 S.E.2d at 196.
108. Oddo, 358 N.C. at 128, 592 S.E.2d at 196.
109. Kathryn Quigley, Love Affair Comes with Price: $1.4 Million in Damages, CHI.
TRIB., June 10, 2001, at 14.
110. Keren Rivas, Alienation Cases Are All Too Common, TIMES-NEWS
(BURLINGTON, N.C.), Feb. 19, 2006, at Al.
111. Id. at A2. The attorney who represented Hutelmyer, the article reported, was
involved in twenty to twenty-five "heart balm" cases since 1997. Id.
112. Representatives Micheaux, Insko, and Wray sponsored one such attempt in
March of 2008. H.B. 681, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007), available at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2007[Bills/HousefPDF/H681vl.pdf. The bill was
entitled "An Act to Abolish the Civil Actions of Alienation of Affection and Criminal
Conversation." Id. The bill proposed that North Carolina General Statutes § 52-14 state:
"The common-law cause of action for criminal conversation is abolished." Id. However,
the bill appears to have disappeared after it was referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary I. See General Assembly of North Carolina, House Bill 1123,
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BiliLookUp/BilILookUp.pl?Session=2007&BilIID=
H681 (last visited Aug. 24, 2009).
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consistently never come up for vote in committees.'13 Nevertheless,
many North Carolina legislators, including Representatives
Micheaux, Insko, and Wray, along with current U.S. Senator Kay
Hagan, have attempted to enact legislation to abolish criminal
conversation." 4 In April of 2009, House Bill 1123, entitled "An Act
to Abolish the Civil Actions of Alienation of Affection and Criminal
Conversation," passed its first reading in the North Carolina House,115
but seems to have been lost in committee.'16 In the summer of 2009,
however, the House passed House Bill 1110 that significantly limits
actions in criminal conversation and alienation of affection.' 7 The
bill prohibits a plaintiff from filing an action in alienation of affection
or criminal conversation more than three years after the last act
occurs that gives rise to the cause of action."' Additionally, the bill
limits a plaintiff's ability to sue for criminal conversation or alienation
of affection after the spouses have separated with the intent that the
separation will be permanent." 9 Though this bill does not abolish
criminal conversation, it is an encouraging step in the right direction.
The bill is also direct evidence of the legislature's desire to limit
criminal conversation. Perhaps in the General Assembly's next term,
after the successful passage of House Bill 1110, a bill like House Bill
1123 will pass.
113. See supra note 112; see also H.B. 1047, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2003),
available at http://www.ncleg.net/sessions/2003/bills/house/pdf/h1047vl.pdf.
114. See discussion supra note 112.
115. H.B. 1123, 2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009), available at
http://www.ncleg.net/sessions/2009/bills/house/pdf/H1123vl.pdf.
116. See General Assembly of North Carolina, House Bill 1123, http://www.ncleg.net/
gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2009&BiIIID=H1123 (last visited Aug. 9,
2009).
117. H.B. 1110, 2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009), available at
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2009&BiIIID=H1110;
see also A heave-ho to the 'he' in the constitution?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
July 8, 2009, at 3B (noting that the bill limiting criminal conversation cleared a Senate
committee).
118. See H.B. 1110, 2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009), available at
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BilILookUpBilILookUp.pl?Session=2009&BiIIID=Hl110.
119. Id. ("No act of the defendant shall give rise to a cause of action for alienation of
affection or criminal conversation that occurs after the plaintiff and plaintiff's spouse
physically separate with the intent of either the plaintiff or plaintiff's spouse that the
physical separation remain permanent.").
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III. WHY NORTH CAROLINA SHOULD ABOLISH CRIMINAL
CONVERSATION
Beyond those stated by North Carolina's courts and legislature,
numerous reasons exist to abolish the tort of criminal conversation.
The continued existence of criminal conversation in North Carolina
illustrates that there are enough proponents of the tort in the state
who have kept the tort alive. But analyzing these proponents'
arguments reveals errors in both theory and reality. Proponents of
the tort are untroubled by its outdated origins because they argue
that the Married Women's Property Act remedied any inequality
between male and female plaintiffs that existed at common law.120
Proponents have long argued that the tort promotes family values and
addresses a concern with the "moral decline in American society."12'
They claim that tort liability can deter marital infidelity,2 and the
"[l]aw ... has regulated sexual conduct" throughout history.123
Though damages in criminal conversation actions may be surprisingly
high, proponents also point out that the tort system is meant to
provide plaintiffs with remedies.'24 Some even suggest that women
suffer more collateral damage from divorce and adultery.1'2 Failure
to provide these women with a tort remedy would "adversely affect
women more than men.' ' 126 These arguments have been put forth for
decades as reasons to keep the tort, but each of them has weakened
with time. The arguments for abolition, however, continue to be
compelling and numerous.
Although the principal purpose of this Comment is to argue for
the complete abolition of criminal conversation, at the very least
North Carolina should consider limiting this action. Possible
limitations would include inserting a mens rea requirement into the
elements of the tort, limiting the tort to pre-separation conduct, and
recognizing the validity of separation agreements that relieve third
parties from liability. These limitations would remedy some of the
worst effects of criminal conversation, such as holding liable
defendants who are unaware of criminal conversation or the marital
120. See Corbett, supra note 12, at 1014-15.
121. Id. at 1052.
122. Id. at 1016-17.
123. Id. at 1018.
124. E.g., id. at 1011.
125. Id. at 1050-51 (stipulating that some of the ways women may suffer more
collateral damages from adultery than men are that married men engage in adultery more
than married women and that many married women are economically dependent on their
husbands).
126. Id. at 1052.
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status of their partners. Though limiting the tort would curb its
negative effects, the most effective way to remedy the ills of criminal
conversation is complete abolition.
A. The Historic Basis for Criminal Conversation No Longer Exists
This section will outline several historic bases for criminal
conversation that, because they are no longer relevant, support
abolishing the tort. First, wives are no longer considered the property
of their husbands. Second, the Married Women's Property Acts
illustrate the inherit contradictions of criminal conversation. Third,
the tort is based on the concept of spousal property rights, rights no
longer recognized today. Fourth, an element of the tort historically
required the subordination of women to their husbands. Fifth, the
modern treatment of adultery illustrates North Carolina's movement
away from treating certain sexual behavior as "criminal," a concept
from which the tort is derived.
The historic premise upon which criminal conversation
developed no longer exists. Wives are no longer considered to be the
property of their husbands. Thus, the need to compensate a man for
his "property loss" when his wife sleeps with another man is certainly
no longer a valid argument to retain criminal conversation. 127 The
Married Women's Property Acts, which extended the right to sue for
criminal conversation to women, '28 do not erase the inherent sexism
of the tort, but actually weaken the tort's foundation. Proponents of
criminal conversation, however, point to the Married Women's
Property Acts as evidence that the sexist underpinnings of the tort are
no longer the reason for its existence.'29 These proponents argue that
since the Married Women's Property Acts permitted women to bring
suits in criminal conversation, the historic basis of the tort is
irrelevant. 130 Many courts and commentators do not agree with this
127. See KOROBKIN, supra note 4, at 135 ("When a new cause of action is invented, as
criminal conversation was in the last decades of the seventeenth century, its legal/factual
requirements inevitably depend on the web of assumptions about the legal and social
world in force at the time. For the tort to continue as a viable legal cause of action, those
assumptions must either remain in force or be replaced by others compatible with the
law's skeletal requirements.").
128. Id. at 127.
129. For an argument rejecting the historical basis of the tort as an argument for its
abolition, see Corbett, supra note 12, at 1014-15.
130. See id.
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argument. 3' The Maryland Court of Appeals abolished the tort of
criminal conversation despite the argument that both sexes could sue
after the Married Women's Property Acts.'32 The court noted that
the gender inequality of the "tort's fundamental underlying
'rationale' could not be canceled out simply by opening litigative
doors to women.', 1
33
At least one commentator sees the Married Women's Property
Acts as a further reason to abolish the tort.'34 The Acts, according to
Laura Korobkin, illustrate the tort's inherent contradictory structure,
regardless of whether it is available as a cause of action to men and
women. 135 Korobkin notes that prior to the enactment of the Married
Women's Property Acts, the classic criminal conversation action was
a property dispute in which damages were awarded to the husband
for trespass with his wife.136 "[T]he wife's role in bringing about the
act of adultery had no bearing on the husband's right to bring the
action" 137 because the husband sued the paramour, not the wife.
Female sexuality was completely irrelevant. 3 8 Thus, "[w]hen wives
began to bring criminal conversation ... cases, courts thus found
themselves constrained by ... the criminal conversation script" that
previously failed to recognize female sexuality.139 Holding a female
defendant liable for her sexual "trespass" with another woman's
husband was contradictory to the assumption that women had no
sexuality, and Korobkin notes that this contradiction was the cause of
the demise of criminal conversation in many courts decades later. 4 °
Opening the doors for women to sue other women for criminal
conversation challenged the historic structure of the tort. For a
woman to sue another woman based on the latter's sexual act, the tort
131. See, e.g., Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 933 (Md. 1980) (holding that the common
law cause of action for criminal conversation is unconstitutional and no longer viable in
Maryland).
132. Id. at n.4 (commenting that the "married women's act did not extend" the right to
bring a criminal conversation claim to women).
133. KOROBKIN, supra note 4, at 172 (noting the court's decision in Kline, 414 A.2d
929).
134. Id. at 160.
135. Id. at 138-39 (arguing that the acceptance of the Marriage Property Acts
eliminated spousal property in one another, but that criminal conversation required
spousal property in one another).
136. Id. at 139.
137. Id. at 160.
138. Id. at 160-61.
139. Id. at 161.
140. Id. at 162.
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implicitly accepted the existence of female sexuality, suggesting that
adultery was a matter of mutual choice rather than seduction.
[T]he structure of the criminal conversation tort still required
that a single actor-the defendant-be held fully financially
responsible for the affair's adverse consequences to the
plaintiff's marriage and family.... If female defendants were
allowed independence and control over their bodies, why
wasn't each marital partner entitled to the same privilege? And
if they were-that is, if adultery was ultimately a choice made
by consenting adults-then on what grounds could a plaintiff-
husband or wife-be entitled to damages when a spouse
decided to engage in an extramarital affair? The causal link
that had made the act of adultery first a direct trespass by the
defendant on the husband's sexual property, then an equally
direct injury to the plaintiff spouse's feelings, was weakening.'42
The Married Women's Property Acts did not eradicate the
inherent problems of the historic basis of criminal conversation.
When the Acts made the tort available to women, courts had to
acknowledge the sexuality of both men and women, which further
complicates the structure of a criminal conversation claim that
imposes liability only on the third party.'43 From this perspective, the
Married Women's Property Acts make the continued existence of the
tort more contradictory than ever.' 44 Criminal conversation was based
on an assumption that sexuality is an exclusively male trait. That is
why at common law only men could sue men. Even if lawmakers no
longer countenance this assumption, it serves as the basis for the tort.
Arguments that the tort serves a social purpose 45 still fall flat when
the history of the tort is so marred by logical inconsistencies and
stereotypical assumptions. It seems unlikely that any member of the
state legislature or judiciary believes that female sexuality is
141. Id. at 168.
142. Id. at 168-69.
143. See id. at 161 (viewing the plaintiff's spouse's "sexual aggression" as irrelevant).
144. Id. at 177.
The female-plaintiff cases came to play an important interim role in the eventual
abolition of the torts, partly by giving women a voice and a story, but at least as
importantly by bringing the torts's narrative assumptions out into the open, where
they could not be ignored. Once seen in the light of day, the cases' property-based
claims looked not just atavistic but ridiculous.
Id.
145. See Corbett, supra note 12, at 1015-16.
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nonexistent. Why, then, does North Carolina law allow plaintiffs to
sue under a tort that assumes so?
Another outdated historic basis for criminal conversation is the
emphasis of spousal property rights. The historic property right that
was the basis of criminal conversation was the fidelity of the wife.'46
The husband was entitled to exclusive sexual relations with her. 4 7 If
this right was compromised, he was entitled to monetary damages as
compensation. 48 Now, as a result of the Married Women's Property
Acts, it would seem that both spouses have an exclusive right to the
fidelity of the other. 149 At least one commentator thinks this "new"
kind of property right is actually beneficial to women, suggesting that
since women are traditionally more dependent on their husbands
than vice versa, allowing wives to sue based on fidelity serves as a
vehicle for empowerment. 50 To classify love, affection, and sexual
autonomy as a property right is an outdated and unrealistic way of
looking at marriage. The Iowa Supreme Court noted, "spousal love is
not property which is subject to theft.... [P]laintiffs in such suits do
not deserve to recover for the loss of or injury to 'property' which
they do not, and cannot, own."' 51 Additionally, courts have rejected
146. See supra Part I.A.
147. See Nunn v. Allen, 154 N.C. App. 523, 535, 574 S.E.2d 35, 43 (2002) (quoting
Johnson v. Pearce, 148 N.C. App. 199, 200, 557 S.E.2d 189, 190 (2001), as a traditional
foundation for a criminal conversation claim).
148. See supra Part I.A.
149. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
150. Corbett, supra note 12, at 1016 ("I think women may derive substantial benefit
from a relational interest in marriage that carries duties that must be respected by
everyone. Second, I think that society benefits from marriages that have duties of
exclusive sexual relations, and a communitarian perspective might require men and
women to make some sacrifices of individual autonomy for the good of society.").
151. Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981) (abolishing
alienation of affections in Iowa); see also Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic:
Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83 MINN. L. REV. 305,340 (1998). Chamallas
describes the "gendered dignitary harms" for which the tort offers redress. Id. at 341.
This harm is
a dignitary or psychological injury to the "betrayed" spouse, of a specifically
gendered sort. Some men describe their response to their wife's adultery-
particularly their realization that another man has "captured" their wife-as a
wound to their manly pride and a disgrace that reflects on the man's "weakness
and inadequacy."
[T]hey are not the sort of injury that the law ought to redress. The sense of
honor that is damaged in each of these scenarios is derived from an outmoded
hierarchical image of husband and wife, in which the wife is treated as the
property of the husband and the marriage is organized primarily to serve the
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the argument that abolishing criminal conversation leaves hapless
plaintiffs with no remedy for their injury because it is unclear the
plaintiffs have suffered the type of "injury" that the tort system is
designed to address. 5 2  In Saunders v. Alford,"'53 the Mississippi
Supreme Court noted:
The problem is that he does not identify how he is injured in
person, property or reputation. Detached as it is from an actual
injury to the marital relation, criminal conversation requires no
actual injury at all. It is born of the notion that the cuckold
spouse ... has some property interest in the chastity of the
other. Such [a] presumption[] and notion[] ha[s] no vitality in
today's society.'54
The Mississippi Supreme Court used the outdated historical basis
of the tort to argue that the injured plaintiff was not really injured at
all according to modern views of marriage and property rights.15
Spousal property rights are no longer recognized because of the
differences between today's legal context and that of common law.'56
Moreover, significant changes in our legal context, such as the
recognition of married women's rights and the rejection of married
women as the property of their husbands, should be reflected in the
law. 5 Significant changes in our social context that affect marriage
and divorce, such as the growing number of professional women 151
husband's sexual and emotional needs. I fear that legal recognition of such harms
would run a great risk of reproducing the sexist ideology behind these gendered
scripts and perpetuating the objectification of women.
Id. at 340-42 (quoting Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, Attitudes of Greek Spouses
Toward Marital Infidelity, in EXTRA-MARITAL RELATIONS 78-79 (Gerhard Neubeck ed.,
1969)).
152. See infra Part III.B.
153. 607 So. 2d 1214 (Miss. 1992).
154. Id. at 1218-19.
155. See id.
156. See Kay Kavanaugh, Note, Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation:
Unholy Marriage in Need of Annulment, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 323, 338-39 (1981).
157. Though the Married Women's Property Acts were a significant step forward for
the law, to retain a tort that originated from a husband's exclusive right to his wife's
sexuality arguably promotes disrespect for the law. For an argument that retaining
criminal conversation is antithetical to current ideas about gender, sexuality, and
contraception, see KOROBKIN, supra note 4, at 170-71 (citing Jacob Lippman, The
Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 651-64 (1930)).
158. "Women comprised 46.5 percent of the total U.S. labor force and are projected to
account for 47 percent of the labor force in 2016." U.S. Dep't of Labor, Quick Stats on
Women Workers (2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/main.htm. "Women are
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and a steady divorce rate,59 should also be reflected in the law.
Today, there is an "implicit and explicit recognition that marital
partners are individuals, 'each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup.' "60 To allow one spouse to assert a property
interest in the sexual behavior of another is to offer a remedy where
there should be none since spousal sexuality is no longer considered a
property right.
Furthermore, criminal conversation should be abolished because
one of its elements is historically based on the subordination of
women to their husbands. An element of criminal conversation is
"coverture."'' 6 Modern cases that cite the elements of the claim tend
to glaze over the historic meaning of "coverture." The common law
doctrine of coverture "meant that the act of marriage collapsed the
wife's legal capacities into the personality and powers of her
husband," creating a legal fiction where the wife's identity was
subsumed by the husband's identity. 62 Coverture is not a synonym
for marriage, it is a separate entity; "[a] wife could recover some of
her legal capacity by agreeing with her husband to cancel her
coverture during marriage." '63 "For centuries, the law of marital
coverture produced-indeed, required-the legal subordination of
wives to their husbands. ' ' "M Feminist scholars have argued that the
common law concept of coverture created a sphere of "privacy" for
the family that "prevented the state from identifying and remedying
dysfunction within marriages." 6 ' When North Carolina courts cite
coverture as an element of a criminal conversation claim, they seem
to use it as a way of describing the marital unit, and not as a reference
projected to account for 49 percent of the increase in total labor force growth between
2006 and 2016." Id.
159. Between 2004 and 2007 the national divorce rate, per 1,000 people, fluctuated
between 3.6 and 3.7 percent. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, National Marriage and
Divorce Rate Trends, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mardiv-tables.htm (last visited Aug.
24, 2009).
160. Kavanaugh. supra note 156, at 339 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972)) (footnote omitted); see supra text accompanying note 129.
161. Brown v. Hurley, 124 N.C. App. 377, 380, 477 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1996) ("The
elements of criminal conversation are the actual marriage between the spouses and sexual
intercourse between defendant and the plaintiff's spouse during the coverture.").
162. Joshua Getzler, Plural Ownership, Funds, and the Aggregation of Wills, 10
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 241, 264 (2009).
163. Id.
164. Melissa Murray, Equal Rites and Equal Rights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1402 (2008).
165. Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving and Caregivers. 94 VA. L. REV. 385. 398 (2008).
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to the subordination of the wife to the husband.'66 The courts
purposefully apply only part of the common law meaning of
coverture; they cite to it to reference the common law concept that "a
husband and wife were one legal entity,"'167 but refrain from alluding
to the aspects of coverture that require the disappearance of the
wife's autonomy. The courts cannot ignore the fact that coverture is
still regarded as a common law method of subordinating women to
the power of their husbands and is an essential element of criminal
conversation.
Additionally, under Johnson v. Pearce, North Carolina courts
extended the concept of "coverture" to apply to post-separation
conduct. 168 If there is ever a time, aside from actual divorce, in which
a husband and wife are less like a marital unit, it is during the period
of separation. North Carolina courts are explicit that post-separation
conduct will not bar a claim for criminal conversation.'69 To hold that
a period in which two people have signed an agreement to live
separate as if unmarried as part of "coverture" is contrary to its
common law definition. Ignoring the historic basis of coverture is
further evidence of the uncomfortable way courts attempt to fit
criminal conversation into a modern legal landscape that recognizes
husbands and wives as autonomous, independent beings.
A further criticism of criminal conversation is its close
relationship with the historic treatment of adultery. At common law,
adultery was a crime, and the earlier in history the more severe the
punishment. 7 ° Today in North Carolina, adultery is still a crime. 7'
166. See, e.g., Brown, 124 N.C. App. at 380, 477 S.E.2d at 237 (1996) (citing "coverture"
as one of the elements of a criminal conversation claim, but not expanding on the concept
outside of the meaning of an existing marriage).
167. Elizabeth Katz, Note, How Automobile Accidents Stalled the Development of
Interspousal Liability, 94 VA. L. REV. 1213, 1220 (2008).
168. Johnson v. Pearce, 148 N.C. App. 199, 200, 557 S.E.2d 189, 190 (2001).
169. See Nunn v. Allen, 154 N.C. App. 523, 535-37, 574 S.E.2d 35, 43-44 (2002). But
see supra Part II.D (indicating that a recently considered bill limits a plaintiff's ability to
sue for criminal conversation after the spouses have separated with the intent that the
separation will be permanent).
170. For a discussion on ancient methods of punishment for female adulteresses, see
supra Part I.A.
171. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2007). "If any man and woman, not being married
to each other, shall lewdly and lasciviously associate, bed and cohabit together, they shall
be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor." Id. "Lewdly and lasciviously" has been interpreted
as "habitually, in the manner of husband and wife." REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 4.8, at
242: see also State v. Kleiman, 241 N.C. 277, 279-80, 85 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1954) (noting that
a single act of illicit sexual intercourse is not fornication and adultery as defined by § 14-
184, but that habitual sexual intercourse for two weeks was sufficient to constitute the
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Yet, Lee's North Carolina Family Law notes that while the State's
continued criminalization of adultery reflects a "certain policy,"
"there are few prosecutions under these statutes."' 172  Professor
Reynolds also notes that in certain situations the criminality of
adultery is disregarded in favor of protecting people from harm or
other "higher goals.' 7'  For example, North Carolina criminalizes
adultery but has also enacted statutes that protect couples who
cohabitate1 74 While adultery remains a crime in North Carolina, the
infrequency with which it is prosecuted 75 suggests that it is not
regarded as a crime in the same sense it was at common law. The
changing attitudes of the legal system toward adultery are further
evidence of how courts and legislatures have rejected the historic
assumptions underlying criminal conversation.
B. Criminal Conversation Does Not Deter Extra-Marital Relations
While past justifications for criminal conversation are
inapplicable now, current justifications, such as deterring extra-
marital relations, do not support the continuance of criminal
conversation. There is a significant lack of evidence that the
continued existence of criminal conversation in North Carolina has
done anything to deter marital infidelity.176  Courts and legal
commentators generally agree that criminal conversation does not
deter adultery.7 7 The Idaho Supreme Court, in abolishing criminal
conversation, noted that "[d]eterrence is not achieved; the nature of
the activities underlying criminal conversation, that is sexual activity,
are not such that the risk of damages would likely be a deterrent.' 1 78
Most state courts, in their abolition of criminal conversation, note
offense). The misdemeanor is "punishable by a fine of $500, six months' imprisonment, or
both." 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 4.8, at 243.
172. 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 4.8, at 246.
173. Id.
174. Id. Specifically, North Carolina has protected unmarried couples that live
together under the domestic violence statute. Id.
175. Id.
176. But see Corbett, supra note 12, at 1016-17 ("I think it is an equally plausible
hypothesis that the prospect of tort liability could dampen the fires of sexual passion.").
Corbett argues that because the financial liability would be placed on the third party and
not the adulterous spouse, the deterrent effect might be achieved by making third party
outsiders less interested in the married person. Id.
177. See, e.g., Thomas v. Siddiqui, 869 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Mo. 1994) (finding plaintiff's
argument that criminal conversation deters adultery unpersuasive and noting that "other
disincentives" exist to more effectively deter adultery).
178. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994).
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that the tort does not deter marital infidelity. 7 9 Modern attitudes
toward marriage and divorce contradict the assertion that the threat
of legal liability promotes a healthy marriage. " '[V]iable contented
marriages are not broken up by the vile seducer of the Nineteenth
Century melodrama, though this is what [criminal conversation]
assumes.' "'18  In Justice McCormick's dissenting opinion in
Bearbower v. Merry, 8' in which the Iowa Supreme Court abolished
criminal conversation, McCormick argued that both of the "heart
balm" torts should be abolished because of the nature of the
dissolution of marriage.'82
The disintegration of a marriage is ordinarily as complex a
process as is its integration. It seldom occurs overnight. It
starts from within. It is not caused by only one factor or
through some imperfection of only one of the spouses. Any
third person who kicks at the cornerstone of a shaky marriage
will not bring it down without active support from one or both
of the parties. It is simplistic and unrealistic to suppose the
edifice will be held together either so long as or because
spouses have the right to obtain vengeance in the form of
damage suits against the third person.'83
The dissent noted that the recovery of damages will "sooth [sic]
the ego" and "enrich[] the purse of the plaintiff," but will do little to
"maintain[] or restore[] a mature and stable marriage between two
individuals with free will and separate identity."'" 4 Proponents of
criminal conversation argue that it deters "interference" with
marriage; 85 yet there is a growing understanding that marriages are
not just broken up by third party interference. Instead, the
interference often begins within the marriage, when two spouses find
themselves discontented with their marriage or with one another.
Punishing a third party for interfering with a marriage unrealistically
assumes that fault lies entirely with that party.
179. See, e.g., Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 232 (Mo. 2003) ("[Slome still argue
that suits for alienation of affection must be retained as a useful means of preserving
marriages and protecting families.... While these are laudable goals, it is unlikely that
suits for alienation of affection actually serve this purpose.").
180. KOROBKIN, supra note 4, at 174 (quoting HOMER H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 267 (West, 1968)).
181. 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978).
182. Id. at 136-38 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 138 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (McCormick, J., dissenting).
185. See Corbett, supra note 12, at 998.
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Additionally, other laws punish adultery more effectively than
criminal conversation. In response to those that argue that abolishing
the tort of criminal conversation would encourage adultery, the
Supreme Court of Missouri noted that there are other areas of family
law that deter adultery. 18 6 The court noted that adultery can serve as
grounds for dissolution, can result in the guilty party receiving "a
smaller split of property after dissolution," or can serve as a means of
"bar[ring] a spouse from certain inheritance rights."' 87  North
Carolina law includes similar statutes. North Carolina allows the
judge to consider "marital misconduct" in determining post-
separation support.8 ' Participating in "illicit sexual behavior" '189 can
prevent a dependent spouse from receiving alimony,190 or affect the
amount of alimony a spouse receives or gives."' These methods of
deterring adultery focus on the break-up of the marriage and deal
exclusively with the estranged spouses. No third party paramours
need be involved. Leaving the deterrence of adultery to these laws
reflects the understanding of marital dissolution reflected in
McCormick's dissent in Bearbower v. Merry.'92 While criminal
conversation might deter extra-marital relations for the few spouses
and paramours who know about the tort and its legal ramifications, if
the purpose is to prevent adultery and promote marriage, there are
186. Thomas v. Siddiqui, 869 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Mo. 1994)
187. Id.
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A(d) (2007).
At a hearing on postseparation support, the judge shall consider marital
misconduct by the dependent spouse occurring prior to or on the date of
separation in deciding whether to award postseparation support and in deciding
the amount of postseparation support. When the judge considers these acts by the
dependent spouse, the judge shall also consider any marital misconduct by the
supporting spouse in deciding whether to award postseparation support and in
deciding the amount of postseparation support.
Id.
189. § 50-16.1A(3)(a) ("[A]cts of sexual or deviate sexual intercourse [or] deviate
sexual acts ... voluntarily engaged in by a spouse with someone other than the spouse.").
190. See § 50-16.3A (2007) ("If the court finds that the dependent spouse participated
in an act of illicit sexual behavior ... during the marriage and prior to or on the date of
separation, the court shall not award alimony.").
191. Id. ("If the court finds that the dependent and the supporting spouse each
participated in an act of illicit sexual behavior during the marriage and prior to or on the
date of separation, then alimony shall be denied or awarded in the discretion of the court
after consideration of all of the circumstances.").
192. Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Iowa 1978) (McCormick, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
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laws designed to punish adultery that keep the punishment
appropriately between the parties to the marriage.
19 3
A further reason for the abolition of criminal conversation is the
fact that the punishment disregards any knowledge on the part of the
defendant of the existence of criminal conversation or even that his or
her behavior could lead to legal liability. Liability is often a trap for
the unwary, especially when one considers the "alarming simplicity"
of the elements of the tort. 94 "In the action for criminal conversation,
the plaintiff can prevail even if the defendant was unaware that the
partner was married.... For these reasons, criminal conversation has
been described as a strict liability tort." '95 Despite the frequency with
which actions for criminal conversation are brought, it is very likely
that a third party defendant might not have any idea that the partner
with whom he or she has begun a sexual relationship is married or
legally separated if the partner does not disclose that fact.
Furthermore, a defendant might not know that criminal conversation
is available as a tort remedy in North Carolina, especially when the
action has been abolished in most states. Many plaintiffs only
become aware of the cause of action when they consult a family law
practitioner. At the very least, ignorance of the tort raises an
argument that the severe punishment of criminal conversation should
be limited. Is it right for persons pursuing a relationship to shoulder
the burden of confirming their partner's legal status as married or
not? Is it reasonable? If paramours are unaware that their conduct
makes them liable for criminal conversation, how can the tort
successfully deter behavior they have no reason to think is wrong?
Criminal conversation should be abolished, or at least seriously
193. It may be possible, although unlikely, for a spouse to sue their spouse's paramour
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Poston v. Poston, 112 N.C. App. 849,
850, 436 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1993) (holding that a husband could not sue his wife for
intentional infliction of emotional distress for her adultery, but leaving unanswered the
question of whether or not the husband could sue her paramour).
194. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 442, at 1246. Remember that the elements of criminal
conversation in North Carolina are only "actual marriage ... and sexual intercourse
between the defendant and the plaintiff's spouse during coverture." Brown v. Hurley, 124
N.C. App. 377, 380, 477 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1996). Of the two "heart-balm" torts, criminal
conversation has been called " 'the more definite action' " because the only conduct that
must be proved is adultery of the defendant and the plaintiff's spouse "without
establishing a causal link between any damages and the defendant's wrongful conduct."
Corbett, supra note 12, at 991 (quoting Robert C. Brown, The Action for Alienation of
Affections, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 472, 474 (1934)).
195. 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 5.46(B), at 403.
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limited, because it fails to deter adultery and imposes liability on
those who might not even be aware of its existence.
C. Abuse of the North Carolina Legal System
The continued existence of criminal conversation promotes
abuse of the North Carolina legal system. A plaintiff suing a
defendant in an action for criminal conversation cannot deter the
spouse or defendant's conduct since infidelity has already occurred
when the action is brought. Since a single plaintiff bringing a criminal
conversation action is bringing the action based on past conduct, the
plaintiff is not motivated by a genuine desire to prevent this type of
behavior in others. Rather, the plaintiff is angry, and seeks
vindication in the courtroom where he or she hopes to be financially
compensated for a primarily emotional and "relational" injury.'96 The
vindictive motivation underlying the tort illustrates several reasons
why it should be abolished. 97 These include the use of the tort for
blackmail and as a means of seeking excessive damages awards.
196. Torts that compensate for "emotional or mental injuries" can be distinguished
from torts that compensate for "relational injuries" or injuries from relationships.
Corbett, supra note 12, at 1025 (describing the difference between the two types of torts
and noting that courts have been more receptive to recognizing emotional injuries than
relational ones).
Since the early twentieth century, there has been a movement in American
tort law to loosen it from its moorings in recognizing recovery for only injury to
physical person and property. One strand of this development has been
recognition of emotional or mental injuries.... The other strand was recognition
of injuries to relationships....
The evolution of tort law in [the twentieth] century has seen the growing
recognition of tort recovery for both emotional injuries and relational injuries. In
the area of emotional injuries ... all or almost all jurisdictions now recognize
intentional infliction of emotional distress or the tort of outrage .... Relational
torts have not made a similar widely chronicled march toward acceptance ....
Id.
197. See, e.g., 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 5.49, at 419 ("[T]he mere filing of actions
for ... criminal conversation can ravage a person's reputation."). But see Corbett, supra
note 12, at 1021-22 (noting that the vindictive motives often accompanying a criminal
conversation action also accompany most other tort actions and, therefore, are not reason
enough to abolish the tort). " 'Revenge, which may be a motive for bringing the cause of
action, has no place in determining the legal rights between two parties.' I disagree. I
think that one of the principal reasons I sue someone for hitting me on the nose is that I
want revenge for his violation of a right of mine." Id. at 1022 (quoting Neal v. Neal, 873,
P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994)). Professor Corbett's analogy is troubling. Suing a third party
for having sex with your spouse is not the same as suing someone who intentionally hits
you on the nose. With criminal conversation actions, it is very possible that the third party
does not know his or her partner is married or separated. Perhaps the third party even
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Criminal conversation is susceptible to blackmail and potentially
malicious prosecution 98 because of the social injury that occurs when
the action is brought. 99 The tort makes private matters public in a
way that does not consider why the actors might have made the
decisions they did. Today, to label one as an "adulterer" might not be
as terrible as it was for Hester Prynne,2° but it certainly carries a
negative connotation. "No matter what the outcome of litigation, the
mere filing of actions for ... criminal conversation can ravage a
person's reputation.""2 1 Parties to separation agreements or property
settlements will sometimes use the ability to bring an action in
criminal conversation as leverage for other favorable concessions.2°z
"Because the mere filing of the action may destroy reputations or
inflict devastating psychological harm, they [sic] have
disproportionate settlement value for unscrupulous plaintiffs. '23
saw a signed separation agreement and believed in good faith that his or her partner's
marriage was over. This situation is different from somebody who hits another on the
nose. The hitter is aware of his or her culpability.
198. Professor Reynolds notes that "actions for malicious prosecution [based on]
frivolous suits for ... criminal conversation usually fail." 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2,
§ 5.49, at 420. In North Carolina, a claim for malicious prosecution requires that the
action be "based on an earlier civil proceeding, the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant initiated the earlier proceeding maliciously, that the earlier proceeding ended in
the plaintiff's favor, and that the plaintiff suffered some special damage to person or
property that would not be the case in other suits of that type." Id. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina has held that damages to reputation that one suffers in an action for
criminal conversation did not satisfy the special damages requirement of malicious
prosecution. Id. (citing Stikeleather v. Willard, 83 N.C. App. 50, 348 S.E.2d 607 (1986)).
199. See generally McComb v. Phelps, No. COA05-362, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 2732
(N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005) (illustrating how criminal conversation can be used in an
extortionate way).
200. Hester Prynne is the main character, an adulteress, of Nathanial Hawthorne's The
Scarlet Letter. See generally NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Vintage
Books/The Library of America 1990) (1850).
201. 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 5.49, at 419.
202. Id.; see also McComb, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 2732, at *2 (discussing one party's
use of the threat of criminal conversation action against the other). The Supreme Court of
North Carolina acknowledged the danger of using the action of criminal conversation as
leverage in Boone v. Boone, 217 N.C. 722, 729-30, 9 S.E.2d 383, 387-88 (1940). In Boone,
the court enjoined the husband from bringing an action for alienation of affections until
the trial court could determine whether the husband had agreed with his wife that he
would not. Id. Even acknowledging the danger of using the tort as leverage, the Supreme
Court seems to have not found this to be sufficient reason to judicially abolish it.
203. 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 5.45(B), at 391. Reynolds is not the only
commentator to suggest that the tort serves as a potential for blackmail. See, e.g.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 929 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1984); see also Paul D. Schoonover, Comment, Piracy on the Matrimonial Seas-
The Law and the Marital Interloper, 25 SW. L.J. 594, 613 (1971) ("[T]he public scandal that
can be engendered by the filing of one of these actions is an open invitation to extortion
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Plaintiffs who know that bringing a claim for criminal conversation
would be crippling to their spouse and his or her paramour need only
threaten to bring the claim to subsequently enjoy a hefty settlement.
Such extortionate behavior is devastating not only to the defendant's
or spouse's reputation, but also to any hope that collaborative divorce
settlement proceedings might take place.2 4
Actions for criminal conversation promote excessive damages
awards. Historically, North Carolina took the view that punitive
damages could only be recovered in an action for criminal
conversation where the defendant's conduct was " 'willful,
aggravated, malicious, or of wanton character.' "205 Now, however, a
jury may consider the issue of punitive damages for an action in
criminal conversation based solely upon evidence that the defendant
engaged in sexual intercourse with the plaintiff's spouse. °6 The very
misconduct necessary to establish the tort of criminal conversation
may also sustain an award of punitive damages. 20 7  For instance, in
Homer v. Byrnett, the fact that the paramour "engaged in sexual
intercourse with the plaintiff's wife [and] before becoming intimate,
[had] met several times to discuss the harm that a sexual relationship
would cause, and yet ... willfully engaged in the injurious conduct"
was more than sufficient evidence to support the award for punitive
damages.2 °8 Other cases follow this simple standard for warranting
punitive damages in an action for criminal conversation.0 9
and blackmail. This problem was a major consideration in the 1930's [sic] campaign to
abolish the actions. If this argument was persuasive then, there is no reason to think it is
less of a problem today.").
204. Cf. McComb, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 2732, at *6 (affirming the dismissal of
plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress after the defendant
threatened to bring a criminal conversation claim against plaintiff, his former lover). The
facts of McComb illustrate how criminal conversation can be used in an extortionate
manner. Defendant and plaintiff began a sexual relationship in 1990. Id. at *1. When
plaintiff learned that defendant was married she broke off the relationship. Id. at *2.
Plaintiff and defendant resumed their relationship when defendant promised to leave his
wife. Id. When defendant did not leave his wife and plaintiff angrily confronted the
defendant, defendant hired a lawyer to send plaintiff a letter threatening to bring a claim
of criminal conversation against plaintiff if she would not leave him alone. Id.
205. Gray v. Hoover, 94 N.C. App. 724, 730, 381 S.E.2d 472, 475 (1989) (citing
Sebastian v. Klutz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 220, 170 S.E.2d 104,116 (1969)).
206. Horner v. Byrnett, 132 N.C. App. 323, 327, 511 S.E.2d 342, 345-46 (1999).
207. Id. at 327, 511 S.E.2d at 345.
208. Id.
209. See Hutelmyer v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 364, 372,514 S.E.2d 554, 560 (1999) (holding
that sexual intercourse alone is enough to warrant punitive damages in a criminal
conversation action); see also 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 5.48(C), at 417-18. Professor
Reynolds notes that "when the plaintiff proves sexual relations between the defendant and
spouse, then it seems to take little else to establish both the tort and the right to punitive
1940 [Vol. 87
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The issue of excessive punitive damages is one characteristic of
criminal conversation that makes it more egregious than alienation of
affection actions,10 thus a brief comparison with alienation of
affection is appropriate here. Common law supports awards of
punitive damages for both torts, but "the law of North Carolina has
conditioned punitive damages on establishing malice beyond what is
needed simply to satisfy the elements of the torts." '' As "alienation
of affections requires proof of malice," it can be difficult for plaintiffs
in actions for alienation of affection to get beyond the requirement of
malice that is necessary to establish the tort itself, and thus generally
more difficult to get punitive damages.212 Criminal conversation,
however, requires no proof of malice.21 3
For [criminal conversation], the question is not whether the
plaintiff has shown malice beyond what is needed to establish
the tort, but what evidence suffices to show the kind of
reckless conduct justifying punitive damages. In fact, the
appellate cases prove that the sexual intercourse that is
necessary to establish the tort also supports an award of
punitive damages. 214
As criminal conversation requires no proof of actual malice, the
requirements for bringing the action ("actual existing marriage plus
sexual intercourse") 215 are the same as those for recovering punitive
damages.216
Punitive damages become a problem when plaintiffs, motivated
primarily by vindictive desires to hurt their spouses, consistently
recover excessive awards. The size of the sums makes the criminal
conversation claim more popular. The pain over a spouse's adultery
turns into greed when a plaintiff learns that millions are just a lawsuit
damages." Id. § 5.48(C), at 418 (citing Scott v. Kiker, 59 N.C. App. 458, 297 S.E.2d 142
(1982) (finding that there was evidence from which the jury could infer sexual relations
and affirming the $25,000 in punitive damages and $25,000 in compensatory damages even
when there was minimal evidence supporting the claims for criminal conversation)).
210. See 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 5.48(C), at 417 (noting that alienation of
affections, unlike criminal conversation, requires a showing of malice).
211. Id. at 416.
212. Id. at 416-17.
213. Id. at 417.
214. Id.
215. Brown v. Hurley, 124 N.C. App. 377, 380, 477 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1996).
216. 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, § 5.48(C), at 417.
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away. In states like North Carolina that continue to recognize
criminal conversation, the number of cases filed appears to be
rising.217 The average recovery for an action in criminal conversation
often runs in the tens of thousands.1 8 Yet, some high profile North
Carolina damages awards suggest that a successful plaintiff in an
action for criminal conversation might recover an award in the
hundreds of thousands or even millions.219 Though it is difficult to
draw the line as to what constitutes an "excessive" damages award,
when the plaintiff's primary motivation for the damages is greed,
vindication, or blackmail, awards in excess of the hundreds of
thousands or millions of dollars begin to raise concerns. Is the ability
to win these amounts a positive characteristic of the North Carolina
legal system? Do we want plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys to
expend their energy trying to catch the spouse "in the act" with a
luckless paramour instead of attempting new forms of separation and
divorce proceedings that emphasize empathy and collaboration? 22°
One North Carolina attorney notes that while attending a Continuing
Legal Education course on the "heart balm" torts in eastern North
Carolina, another attorney noted that she was attending because
there was "money to be made" in the torts.221 The attorney's
comment reveals what is probably the single most motivating factor
for bringing a criminal conversation action: money. The use of the
tort as a way to fill the purses of plaintiffs and their lawyers has
become an embarrassment for the North Carolina legal system. Torts
are meant to compensate injured plaintiffs. The damages plaintiffs
have received in criminal conversation are not astronomical in
themselves, but they are very large when one considers what "injury"
the plaintiffs have suffered. Damages in the hundreds of thousands
and millions are inappropriate when there is a question as to whether
any injury has occurred or not.
D. North Carolina's Growing Interest in Collaborative Divorce
Criminal conversation frustrates this state's promotion of
collaborative divorce, a process that resolves divorces in a more
humane way and greatly increases judicial economy. In 2003, North
Carolina joined Texas as the second state to enact a statute
217. KOROBKIN, supra note 4, at 178.
218. See discussion supra Part II.C.
219. See discussion supra Part II.C.
220. Collaborative divorce will be discussed infra Part III.D.
221. Email from Jeff Miller, Solo Practitioner, to Author (Dec. 17, 2008, 7:14:49 EST)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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authorizing the use of collaborative law procedures for divorce.222
Collaborative divorce is a recent trend that seeks to limit the
destructive nature of divorce proceedings.223  Collaborative law
" 'rejects the adversarial system' ,224 by having divorcing couples and
their attorneys sign a binding agreement to make a good faith attempt
to "resolve disputes arising from dissolution of the marriage by
reaching an agreement rather than by judicial intervention. '"225
Couples contemplating divorce sign a collaborative law agreement
committing themselves and their attorneys to " 'good faith
bargaining, voluntary full disclosures, interest-based bargaining, [and]
inclusion of relational and long term interests in the identification of
clients' goals and strategies.' ,226 The terms of the collaborative
agreement are usually realized. through a series of four-way meetings
between the parties and their attorneys. 221 "From the outset of these
meetings, the focus is on negotiation, and in that setting, collaborative
law practitioners provide a 'civilized process, produce outcomes
meeting the needs of both parties, minimize costs, and increase
clients' control, privacy, and compliance with agreements.' ",228 On
the whole, collaborative divorce is a more humane, more cost
efficient, and remarkably more congenial process than a traditional
adversarial divorce.229
222. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-70 to -79 (2007). The applicable Texas statute is TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603. See Elizabeth K. Strickland, Comment, Putting "Counselor"
Back in the Lawyer's Job Description: Why More States Should Adopt Collaborative Law
Statutes, 84 N.C. L. REV. 979, 982 (2006) ("Although only two states currently have
collaborative law statutes, practitioners in other states and countries have begun using the
technique, forming groups to develop training and practice protocols for collaborative
law.").
223. See Strickland, supra note 222, at 982.
224. Id. at 983 (quoting Pamela H. Simon, Collaborative Law: How Goes the Quiet
Revolution?, FAM. F. (N.C. Bar Ass'n Family Law Section, Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 2003, at 1,
1).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 984 (quoting Pauline Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 317, 320 (2004)).
227. Id.
228. Id. (quoting John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss:
Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce
Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 280, 281 (2004)).
229. Though collaborative divorce is still a relatively new procedure, proponents of it
have noted that "years of experience with collaborative law indicates that no other
dispute-resolution modality matches collaborative law in its ability to manage conflict,
elicit creative 'out of the box' solutions, and support parties in realizing their highest
intentions for their lives after the legal process is over." PAULINE H. TESLER,
COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT
LITIGATION 1, 5 (2001).
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Collaborative law procedures also have another important
benefit-relieving an overburdened court system. "[B]ecause
collaborative law takes places outside the court setting, it has the
potential to alleviate the strain on judicial resources associated with
traditional court-obtained divorces" and civil suits like criminal
conversation that arise out of divorce or separation proceedings.23
[N]o-fault divorce and the presence of additional life
stressors have resulted in an increase in the number of divorces
and divorce-related proceedings in state courts. Furthermore,
courts are already overwhelmed by growing civil dockets, an
issue further complicated by budget cuts, mandatory personnel
cuts, and similar factors. If more couples chose to use
collaborative law, fewer cases would go to court, and dockets
would be clearer. Collaborative lawyers would also have more
time within each case to devote to engaging in effective
problem solving with their client instead of spending the
majority of their time on discovery, working on court
documents, and preparing for court appearances. Moreover,
collaborative law is also "readily adaptable across jurisdictional
lines, despite significant differences in substantive and
procedural laws from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. '231
Additionally, there is evidence that in collaborative law costs are
"manageable" and generally less expensive than litigation.23 2
Collaborative proceedings "typically [cost] clients only one-tenth to
one-twentieth of what a normal in-court case costs. ' 233 Collaborative
law is more cost effective than traditional litigation because it is a
more efficient process for the parties' needs and objectives.3 Parties
and attorneys need not burden themselves with extensive filings,
discovery, and motions.235 Instead, they can move directly to face-to-
face meetings where the dispute can be privately resolved.236
230. Strickland, supra note 222, at 997 (describing how collaborative law procedures
ease burdens on the court system).
231. Id. (quoting Pauline Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J.
317, 317 (2004)).
232. TESLER, supra note 229, at 8.
233. Pauline Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 324
(2004).
234. Strickland, supra note 222, at 987.
235. Id.
236. Id.
1944 [Vol. 87
2009] ABOLISHING CRIMINAL CONVERSATION
North Carolina has demonstrated its interest in promoting
collaborative divorce by enacting a Collaborative Divorce Act.237 The
Act defines collaborative law as:
a procedure in which a husband and wife who are separated
and are seeking a divorce, or are contemplating separation and
divorce, and their attorneys agree to use their best efforts and
make a good faith attempt to resolve their disputes arising from
the marital relationship on an agreed basis. The procedure
shall include an agreement by the parties to attempt to resolve
their disputes without having to resort to judicial intervention,
except to have the court approve the settlement agreement and
sign the orders required by law to effectuate the agreement of
the parties as the court deems appropriate. The procedure shall
also include an agreement where the parties' attorneys agree
not to serve as litigation counsel, except to ask the court to
approve the settlement agreement.238
The North Carolina statutes include the basic principles of
collaborative law-that divorcing or separating couples shall work
together, in a good faith attempt to resolve disputes, with the
intention not to use judicial interference to accomplish their goals.239
The North Carolina statutes include more elaborate provisions
and some specifications of the collaborative process that the Texas
statute does not.240 For instance, the North Carolina statutes include
a set of definitions for "collaborative law, collaborative law
agreements, collaborative law procedures, [and] settlement
agreements., 24 1 Similar to the Texas statute, the North Carolina
statutes provide that once the parties have given notice to the court
that they have agreed on collaborative procedures, "the court cannot
take action ... unless the parties fail to reach a settlement
agreement. '242  The North Carolina statute, however, goes a bit
further than the Texas statute and states that "if the dispute is not
resolved through collaborative law procedures, parties can file a civil
suit, but only if the collaborative law agreement does not first provide
237. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-70 to -79 (2007).
238. § 50-71(1).
239. Id.
240. Strickland, supra note 222, at 991-92.
241. Id. at 990; see also § 50-71(1)-(4) (providing statutory definitions).
242. Strickland, supra note 222, at 991.
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for other means of alternative dispute resolution. 2 43 The North
Carolina statutes include several other provisions that differ from the
Texas statute, including guidelines for tolling,2" providing for other
methods of alternative dispute resolution,2 45  and continuing
procedures of collaborative law after the death of a deceased
spouse.2 46 Overall, the "North Carolina statute[s are] more complex
and detailed than the Texas statute.12 47  Thus, North Carolina has
enacted collaborative law statutes that reflect not only general
collaborative law principles, but also the state's interest in creating its
own system of collaborative law.
The fact that North Carolina was the second state to enact a
collaborative law statute, and that it did so with a level of detail and
specificity that exceeds the only other collaborative law statute in
effect at the time, is evidence of the state's interest in promoting
collaborative procedures. Divorce proceedings are increasingly
inappropriate to resolve in the courtroom: "To ask a court and jury to
pinpoint, with any degree of accuracy, the cause of a marital breakup
is to invite judicial involvement in intimate and complex human
relationships to a disturbing degree. 2 4  The North Carolina
legislature has illustrated its agreement. When the House Bill for
Collaborative Law Procedures came before the North Carolina
House of Representatives in April of 2003, 115 votes were cast, and
all 115 were for the passage of the bill.249
243. Id.; see § 50-76(a) ("If the parties fail to reach a settlement and no civil action has
been filed, either party may file a civil action, unless the collaborative law agreement first
provides for the use of arbitration or alternative dispute resolution.").
244. § 50-73 (2007) (providing that a valid collaborative law agreement tolls all legal
deadlines, including statutes of limitation, trial and hearing dates, filing and discovery
deadlines, and scheduling orders); see also Strickland, supra note 222, at 991 (describing
the differences between the Texas and North Carolina collaborative laws and noting the
North Carolina tolling provision).
245. § 50-78 ("[N]othing in [the statute] shall be construed to prohibit the parties from
using, by mutual agreement, other forms of alternative dispute resolution ... to reach a
settlement on any of the issues in the collaborative law agreement.").
246. § 50-79 ("[Tlhe personal representative of the estate of a deceased spouse may
continue a collaborative law procedure with respect to equitable distribution that has been
initiated by a collaborative law agreement prior to death, notwithstanding the death of one
of the spouses.").
247. Strickland, supra note 222, at 991.
248. Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet
Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 669 (1995).
249. 1 J. OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF N.C., H.B. 1126, 1st Sess., at 616
(2003). The bill again passed on July 18, 2003, with 109 votes cast and all voting for
passage. See 2 J. OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF N.C., H.B. 1126, 1st Sess., at
1332 (2003).
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Relating to divorce proceedings, criminal conversation renders
collaborative law virtually impossible. Criminal conversation seeks to
resolve issues arising out of a troubled marriage entirely in the
courtroom. "Adultery may begin in the privacy of the bedroom, but
Ccriminal conversation' ends in the glare of the courtroom....
Criminal conversation stories transform intimate experiences of
conflict and suffering into public, commercial discourse."25' The
North Carolina collaborative law statutes expressly state that the
intention of collaborative law is to keep personal, family disputes
arising out of a divorce or separation outside of the courtroom. 1
Criminal conversation inherently generates much litigation, and
contradicts the principles of collaborative law. "[C]ourts are far from
ideal places to resolve issues surrounding the breakdown and
restructure of a family."2 2 Particularly, litigation can be "destructive
and lead[] to undesirable psychological outcomes for families,
especially those with children, who need nurturing during the difficult
time of divorce." '253 Because criminal conversation is a tort action, it
takes place in a litigious setting. Additionally, the nature of the
criminal conversation action makes it an especially adversarial and
destructive process for all parties involved. The process of bringing
an action for criminal conversation-from the initial complaint to the
complications of discovery-requires families already torn apart to
hash out the intimate and painful details of their dissolution as well as
crowd already overburdened civil dockets. All of the benefits of
collaborative law that lessen the burden on the court system and the
financial burdens on the parties are lost when criminal conversation
enters the equation. Criminal conversation immediately halts the
collaborative law proceedings by taking the dispute to court, meaning
the possible benefits of collaborative law are lost.
The continued availability of a criminal conversation action in
North Carolina prevents potential participants and the court system
from benefiting from the positive effects of collaborative law. As
collaborative law grows in popularity, the availability of criminal
conversation hinders the ability of collaborative law to reach those
parties that might be able to resolve their marital disputes through
250. KOROBKIN, supra note 4, at 136.
251. See § 50-71.
252. Strickland, supra note 222, at 996.
253. Id.
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collaborative procedures. 4  The extent to which collaborative
divorce would rise in frequency by the abolition of criminal
conversation is unknown. If North Carolina abolished criminal
conversation, people involved in divorces or separations might enjoy
the benefits of collaborative law that would not have had the chance
if the action were available. Additionally, if proponents argue that
criminal conversation promotes marriage,255 collaborative procedures
might be more conducive to reconciliation than the litigious nature of
a criminal conversation suit. Few benefits are derived from an action
in criminal conversation aside from the plaintiff's possible financial
remedy and a sense of vindication. Considering the state's interest in
promoting collaborative divorce, another reason in favor of
abolishment of criminal conversation is its frustration of collaborative
divorce procedures. Even the small chance that a few more couples
might enjoy the benefits of collaborative divorce outweighs many
arguments in favor of keeping criminal conversation on the books.
CONCLUSION
It is not only the right, but the duty of the courts to re-examine
questions when justice demands it, and to depart from or
modify old rules when necessary to bring the law in accord with
present-day standards of wisdom and justice [and] to adapt
their practice and course of proceeding as far as possible to the
existing state of society.... 256
254. Criminal conversation acts as a hindrance to civil divorce proceedings. Cf. 2
KELSO, supra note 99, § 18:6, at 171-72 (arguing that North Carolina should reduce its one
year of separation requirement before a couple can obtain a divorce). Kelso cites actions
in criminal conversation as a potential danger for couples that desire a divorce but must
wait for the one-year period to pass before their divorce is final.
The time period while waiting for an artificial one year legal deadline to run can
be a source of continuing emotional pain and discord as the parties linger in a state
of limbo between not really married, but not yet divorced. Those who cannot wait
often strike up a new relationship and often engage in the immoral conduct of
adultery and unmarried cohabitation. Such conduct may subject a paramour to a
suit for criminal conversation, even though they may have a valid separation
agreement.
Id.
255. See Corbett, supra note 12, at 998.
256. Cannon v. Miller, 71 N.C. App. 460, 495, 322 S.E.2d 780, 803 (1984) (quoting 1
AM. JUR. 2D. Actions § 49 (1962) (alteration in original), vacated, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d
888 (1985).
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals used these words in its
opinion in Cannon v. Miller 57 in 1984 to describe the duty it felt to
abolish criminal conversation in North Carolina. The court's
comment summarizes what is perhaps the most troublesome aspect of
criminal conversation: it is an ancient tort that is being used in a
modern time in an inappropriate way. Plaintiffs sue for criminal
conversation not to recover their property rights in their spouse, but
to potentially recover millions in damages. Plaintiffs do not sue
because they want to prevent adultery in North Carolina; they sue
because they want to punish their spouses emotionally and their
spouses' lovers financially. Criminal conversation does not promote
marriage; it makes the end of a marriage much more painful and
costly.
This Comment has described the origins of criminal conversation
and its application today in North Carolina. The history of criminal
conversation is a principal argument for its abolition. The historic
basis of the tort illustrates that criminal conversation is derived from
social attitudes about gender and sexuality that are no longer
acceptable today." 8 From the historic understanding of "coverture"
and its elimination of the wife's personal identity to the rapidity with
which so many states abolished the action after the Married Women's
Property Acts, the history of criminal conversation raises the question
of why North Carolina continues to recognize an action so antithetical
to our current understanding of marriage, spousal autonomy, and
what causes divorce.
Beyond historic justifications, revised and new justifications for
criminal conversation do not support retaining the tort. Criminal
conversation does not deter adultery. Judges, legal scholars, and very
likely the plaintiffs themselves understand that threat of legal liability
does little to deter extra-marital relations.259 Additionally, criminal
conversation does not deter extra-marital behavior because of
widespread ignorance that criminal conversation exists as well as
ignorance of what constitutes culpable conduct. A single person who
meets another person who appears to be single-he or she lives alone
and does not mention a former spouse or a legal separation-
unknowingly becomes liable for criminal conversation if he or she
begins a sexual relationship with a person whose divorce is not
257. 71 N.C. App. 460, 322 S.E.2d 780 (1984).
258. See supra Part III.A.
259. See supra Part III.B.
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final.26 Situations like this are not uncommon and to impose liability
on those defendants is unjust.
Criminal conversation is an open invitation for angry, embittered
plaintiffs who seek financial liability from a third party who is, in most
cases, not the only reason for the plaintiff's failed marriage. This
Comment does not advocate adultery, and plaintiffs who are hurt and
humiliated by their spouse's infidelity are deserving of sympathy and
compassion. But, to drag a third party through the ordeal of a
criminal conversation trial in order to heal the wounds of a broken
marriage is not an appropriate use of the North Carolina court
system. Furthermore, the vindictive spirit of a criminal conversation
action has been used for blackmail and leverage in settlement
proceedings. This reason alone has been the catalyst for many states
to abolish the action,261 and North Carolina should follow suit.
North Carolina has illustrated its interest in promoting
collaborative law in this state and criminal conversation frustrates
that intent. The state legislature overwhelmingly supported the
Collaborative Divorce Act and enacted a statute that offers specific
guidance for family law practitioners who want to promote
collaborative law in North Carolina.262 In a court system that is
consistently overburdened and understaffed,263 procedures that
promote out-of-court dispute resolutions are preferable from an
economic perspective as well as a humane one. Collaborative law
keeps parties out of the combative courtroom environment and
promotes conversation, empathy and healing. Yet, criminal
conversation contradicts the very purpose of collaborative law. For
the plaintiffs who have the wherewithal to find out about the tort of
criminal conversation, or consult an enterprising family law
practitioner, an action in criminal conversation-with the potential to
get millions for your estranged spouse's infidelity-looks pretty
attractive. Suddenly, the idea to try collaborative procedures
becomes less attractive for the spouse who has been hurt by the
260. See supra Part II.B.
261. See, e.g., Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 931 (Md. 1980) ("The action for criminal
conversation is notorious for affording a fertile field for blackmail and extortion."); see
also Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 483, 322 S.E.2d at 795 n.11 (listing several states in which the
concern for blackmail is so serious, it is a crime to file a complaint based on criminal
conversation).
262. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
263. See George K. Walker, Arbitrating Family Law Cases by Agreement, 18 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 429, 430 (2003) (noting that the combination of an increased
civil case load and the speedy trial requirement for criminal trials have clogged and
delayed the judicial process in state court systems).
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other's infidelity. The continued existence of criminal conversation in
North Carolina prevents couples that might seek collaborative
procedures from exploring the much healthier, more economic and
conciliatory divorce process of collaborative law.
Since criminal conversation derives from common law, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has the authority to abolish the
action. Yet, the court has relied on the legislature, which has also
failed to act.2" Unfortunate defendants and separated couples trying
to begin a new life are left unprotected in North Carolina. Again, this
Comment does not agree with marital infidelity; it only seeks to
illustrate that criminal conversation does not effectively prevent it.
There are other, better ways for the State to promote marriage;
refusing to abolish an ancient tort subject to widespread abuse is not
the answer. Criminal conversation should not be abolished simply
because it is outdated, but because it is outdated and abused. It is
used in a way that not only destroys peoples' lives, but also respect for
the North Carolina legal system. It is the duty of the state legal
system to promote fairness and justice; keeping criminal conversation
alive in North Carolina does neither.
CAROLINE L. BATCHELOR
264. See supra Part II.D.
1951
